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The eurozone needs its own budget with significant capacity
to absorb major shocks and tackle the crisis.
by Blog Admin
Herman Van Rompuy, President of the European Council, has called for a euro-area budget,
with the ability to absorb country-specific shocks in member states at a central level. Guntram
Wolff  looks at these proposals, saying that there is a strong case for a eurozone federal
budget, and a strongly defined banking union, to be used for stabilisation policy. He suggests
that the existing European Stability Mechanism should be explored as a basis for developing
the eurozone’s fiscal capacity.
In the run up to last week’s important European Council, Herman Van Rompuy published a
report that dedicates two of  eight pages to a “f iscal capacity f or the EMU”, going beyond the EU budget.
He sees this capacity as f acilitating the absorption of  country-specif ic shocks by providing f or some
absorption at the central level. Moreover, the f iscal capacity should promote structural ref orms and improve
competit iveness, while not leading to permanent transf ers nor undermining incentives to address structural
weaknesses and stick to f iscal discipline. Finally, it would be able to borrow. So how could such a euro-area
budget be structured, how would it work and is it really the missing part of  a “genuine” monetary union?
Here are some key considerations.
Euro-area countries such as Spain and Ireland that f ollowed the f iscal rules in the run up to the crisis
responded to the downturn and the huge private sector deleveraging with a f iscal expansion. The rules of
the Stability and Growth Pact f oresaw that in such a situation the national automatic stabilisers would take
care of  the downturn. But the recession has been so deep and the associated banking sector problems so
large that debt- to-GDP ratios have increased very rapidly. The mechanics of  monetary union imply that
markets are less and less willing to f inance f iscal def icits. Country borrowing essentially leads to balance-
of -payment crises with private sector f inancing drying up and bond yields rising f or the government and the
private sector. This f urther deepens the recession. The basic idea of  Maastricht – that national
stabilisation policy would suf f ice – has proved wrong f or such large shocks.
Fiscal f ederations theref ore typically assign stabilisation
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Fiscal f ederations theref ore typically assign stabilisation
f unctions to the f ederal level. The f ederal stabilisation
policy f ulf ils two basic f unctions. First, it is aimed at
stabilising large regional shocks. Second, it aims to
provide a response to a recession in the f ederation as a
whole. National stabilisation policy alone will not provide
an adequate aggregate f iscal response because of  f ree
riding behaviour. In the euro area, no clear f iscal response
to the drop in GDP growth of  -0.5 percentage points next
year has been f ormulated, and the space f or monetary
policy to address this decline in GDP is limited. There is
thus a strong case f or a f ederal budget to be used f or
stabilisation policy, but this would have to be well def ined.
Federations also provide public goods such as def ence
and price and f inancial stability. Views on def ence policy
are certainly too dif f erent f or this to become a public
good provided in the euro area. For f inancial stability,
steps towards a banking union have been agreed, but
central parts of  the banking union are still missing. One
option would thus be to use a f ederal budget as a
backstop to the banking union, thereby breaking the
vicious circle between banks and sovereigns that
currently undermines f inancial stability. The f iscal backstop behind common resolution will mean that
f inancial conditions stabilise across the euro area.
A well-def ined banking union with a common f iscal backstop would be an important stabilisation tool as it
would absorb the impact of  regional shocks on the f inancial system. But f ederations typically use additional
stabilisation tools, such as unemployment insurance, to mitigate regional shocks. Should the euro area
contemplate such measures? In the short run, this appears to be dif f icult. Introducing common
unemployment insurance while keeping labour market laws national could create signif icant incentives to
f ree-ride on the common insurance provision. Yet in the long-run, more labour-market harmonisation may
be desirable. A more f easible approach now would consist of  increasing and re-designing Structural and
Cohesion Funds in the euro area to target growth in the most-af f ected countries. Overall, it  is clear that in
case of  major shocks, support would be provided f or several years.
How should the euro-area budget be f inanced? Ideally, the revenue source should be stable and have
minimal distorting ef f ects. Using taxes that have an already f airly harmonised base at EU level, such as VAT
or corporate taxes or the f inancial transaction tax, may be one option, but agreed contributions f rom
national budgets would also be possible. Clearly, separate euro-area resources to support the emerging
banking union and growth in the most af f ected countries would be a key ingredient in making the euro area
more stable and monetary union more ef f ective. The European Stability Mechanism, as a euro-area
institution, should be f urther explored as a basis f or the euro-area budget.  The next step may be to grant
some tax-raising autonomy underpinned by greater democratic legit imacy. Certainly, the euro area needs a
mechanism with signif icant resources to absorb major shocks.
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